


Exhibit 1

Robb Elementary School Attack Response Assessment and Recommendations



ALERT
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

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The following abbreviations are used throughout the report.

ISS – Internal School Surveillance
 FH – Funeral Home video footage
 OS – Officer Statement
 IOI – Investigating Officer Interview
 BWC – Body Worn Camera
 UPD CS – Uvalde Police Department Call Sheet
 RL – Radio Logs
 UCISD PD – Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department
 UPD – Uvalde Police Department
 DPS – Texas Department of Public Safety
 BP – Border Patrol
 BORTAC – Border Patrol Tactical Teams

This report was created using school video, third party video exterior of school, body cameras, radio logs, verbal testimony of officers on scene, and verbal statements from investigators. This report should not be considered a definitive or final report as all investigatory options have not been exhausted at this point. This report should be considered a living document. It is subject to changes as new or further evidence becomes available. This report is being compiled for the explicit purpose of identifying training gaps to be addressed by police officers across the state of Texas. The authors of this report are subject matter experts in their field of active attack incidents, patrol, and tactical operations with over 150 years of combined experience. These are the expert opinions based on experience, research, and studies of other incidents and not a formal accusation of the responders on this incident.

Introduction

Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas was attacked on May 24, 2022. The attack resulted in 21 fatalities (19 students and 2 teachers) and 17 injuries. The Texas Department of Public Safety contacted the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center soon after the attack to assess the law enforcement response. The ALERRT Center was selected for this task for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, ALERRT is nationally recognized as the preeminent active shooter / attack response training provider in the nation. ALERRT was recognized as the national standard in active shooter response training by the FBI in 2013. ALERRT's excellence in training was recognized in 2016 with a Congressional Achievement Award.

More than 200,000 state, local, and tribal first responders (over 140,000 law enforcement) from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories have received ALERRT training over the last 20 years. The ALERRT course catalog includes several courses designed to prepare first responders to 1) isolate, distract, and neutralize an active shooter, 2) approach and breach a crisis site using traditional and non-traditional methods, 3) incorporate effective command to manage a rapidly evolving active situation, and 4) manage traumatically injured patients to improve survivability. ALERRT's curriculum is developed and maintained by a team of subject matter experts with over 150 years combined law enforcement, fire, and tactical experience.

ALERRT training is research based. The ALERRT research team not only evaluates the efficacy of specific response tactics (Blair & Martaindale, 2014; Blair & Martaindale, 2017; Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014; Blair, Martaindale, & Sandel, 2019; Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013;) but also has a long, established history of evaluating the outcomes of active shooter events to inform training (Martaindale, 2015; Martaindale & Blair, 2017; Martaindale, Sandel, & Blair, 2017). Specifically, ALERRT has utilized case studies of active shooter events to develop improved curriculum to better prepare first responders to respond to similar situations (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).

For these reasons, ALERRT staff will draw on 20 years of experience training first responders and researching best practices to fulfill the Texas DPS request and objectively evaluate the law enforcement response to the May 24, 2022, attack at Robb Elementary School. This initial report will be focused on the portion of the response up until the suspect was neutralized.

The information presented in this report is based on a incident briefing held for select ALERRT staff on June 1, 2022. The briefing, which was held for approximately 1 hour, was led by an investigating officer with knowledge of the event and investigative details. Briefing materials included surveillance footage from the school, Google Maps, a brief cell phone video, and verbal questions and answers between ALERRT staff and the investigator. We were first oriented to the location of this incident by the investigator via Google Maps. We were then given a chronological timeline of events and actions by the investigator as we reviewed the cell phone and school surveillance video. All times presented in this report are based on timelines provided by investigators. Additionally, we have received additional information as the investigation is still ongoing. The timeline presented here is based on the most current information as of 6/30/2022.

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The report will begin by presenting a thorough timeline of events as evidenced through video footage and details garnered from the ongoing investigation. Each entry cites the data source (refer to abbreviations presented on the Table of Contents). Following the timeline, we will comment on tactics utilized by responding officers. Information related to breaching options will be presented as a supplemental attachment at the end of the report. The tactical discussion is the opinion of ALERRT, and it is based on years of extensive training, research, and an ever-evolving understanding of active shooter response. The concepts discussed are foundational to ALERRT's nationwide training curriculum. While the discussion will be frank and objective, it is not meant to demean the actions taken by law enforcement during this incident. Rather, the discussion is intended to improve future response. For this reason, attention will be drawn to actions that worked well and actions that did not.

Detailed Timeline



Figure 1. Overhead View

At 11:27:14, a female teacher (Female 1) exits the exterior door in the west hall propping the door open with a rock to prevent it from closing behind her (see Figure 2 for suspect entry point). (ISS)

At 11:28:25, the suspect becomes involved in a motor vehicle crash in a dry canal near the elementary school. Two people from a nearby business approached the crash scene at 11:29:02. The suspect engaged them both with a rifle. The two people were able to flee back to the business unharmed and called 9-1-1. (FH)

At 11:29:40, Female 1 returns through the west entry deliberately kicking the rock from the door jamb. Female 1 pulls the door shut and continues to look out of the exterior door as she is frantically speaking on her cell phone. Female 1 attempts to enter a door on the south side of the west hallway only to find it locked. Female 1 knocked on the door, and it was eventually answered by another female (Female 2). Female 1 appears to advise Female 2 of the emergency whereupon Female 2 re-enters her room and secures the door. Female 1 moves into a room closest to the exit on the north side of the west hallway. Female 1 re-enters the hallway numerous times yelling down the hall for students to get into their classrooms. (ISS)

At 11:30:14, the suspect, wearing dark clothing and carrying a bag, left the crash scene and climbed a chain-link fence onto the elementary school property. The suspect walked deliberately across the open grounds between the fence and the teachers' parking lot. The suspect moved towards the school buildings on the westmost side of the campus. Although a defect that might have been caused by a bullet was located on a building south of the affected structure, it could not be

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substantiated at this time that any rounds were fired at a teacher and children on the playground at the time of the crash. (FH)

At 11:31:36, the suspect is captured on video between the cars shooting, and a Uvalde Patrol unit is captured arriving at the crash site. (FH)

At 11:31:43, a Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police officer drives through the west gate near the crash site and across the field to the south side of the affect building, at a high rate of speed. (FH)

At 11:32:08, the suspect reached the west teachers' parking lot adjacent to the affected building and fired through windows into the westmost rooms prior to entering the building. (FH and audio file from ISS)




Figure 2. Suspect Entry Point

Prior to the suspect's entry into the building at 11:33:00, according to statements, a Uvalde Police Officer on scene at the crash site observed the suspect carrying a rifle outside the west hall entry. The officer, armed with a rifle, asked his supervisor for permission to shoot the suspect. However, the supervisor either did not hear or responded too late. The officer turned to get confirmation from his supervisor and when he turned back to address the suspect, he had entered the west hallway unabated. (OS per investigating officer interview).

Note: The internal school surveillance (ISS) video consisted of a ceiling-mounted camera that was situated at the intersection of three intersecting hallways (as indicated by the yellow star in Figure 3) This camera captured 1) the suspect's entry point, which was the short (West) hallway leading to an exterior door; 2) a second long hallway (South) with multiple classrooms on either side of the hall and an exterior door at the southmost end of the hall; and 3) a third hallway (East) that leads to other classrooms, restrooms, a teachers' lounge, a library, and an exterior door at the eastmost end of the hallway.



Figure 3. West Building Layout

At 11:33:00, the suspect enters the school from the exterior door in the west hall while holding a rifle. The suspect looked around the hallway and then continued to walk down the west hallway before turning right (down the south hallway). The suspect walked past a series of rooms with closed doors and a firewall “break.” before making his way to room 111 and 112. (ISS)

At 11:33:24, upon reaching rooms 111 and 112, the suspect fired a series of rounds from the hallway in the direction of classrooms 111 and 112. (ISS)

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At 11:33:32, the suspect made entry into what appears to be classroom 111. Immediately, children's screams could be heard along with numerous gunshots in the classrooms. The rate of fire was initially very rapid then slowed, lasting only a few seconds. (ISS)

At 11:33:37, the suspect backed out of what appears to be classroom 111 into the south hallway. The suspect made a slight turn to what appears to be his left and fires a series of rounds from the hallway into classroom 112. The suspect then re-enters what appears to be classroom 111 and continues to fire what is estimated to be over 100 rounds by 11:36:04 (according to audio analysis). During the shooting the sounds of children screaming, and crying, could be heard (according to audio analysis). (ISS)




Figure 4. Officers Initial Entry into West Building

After the suspect made entry into the west building, three Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers gathered on Geraldine Street (behind police vehicles) in front of the school drop-off / pick-up area. Then the officers, using a bounding overwatch tactic, move quickly (one at a time) to the west door.

At 11:35:55, all three Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers entered the structure through the west door into the west hallway. These officers were equipped with the following: one with external armor and two with concealable body armor, two rifles, and three pistols. At 11:36:00, four officers entered the south hallway through the south door closest to the suspect. It is not clear what equipment these officers had with them. Four more officers entered the west hallway through the west door at 11:36:03. Three of these officers were from the UPD and one was from the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISD PD). They were equipped with three external body armor carriers and one with concealable body armor and pistols. (ISS)

It did not appear that any of the officers were in possession of breaching tools, medical equipment, ballistic shields, or “go-bags.” (ISS)

NOTE: *A “go-bag” is typically a bag or backpack that is widely used in the law enforcement community to respond to critical incidents. The “go-bag” commonly consists of spare ammunition, medical equipment, and breaching tools. The purpose of the “go-bag” is to carry equipment needed for a specialized response, when carrying that equipment on a regular basis is not feasible. Taking a “go-bag” into a crisis site facilitates the availability and implementation of these tools in a patrol response where tactical assets and teams are not readily available.*

At 11:36:04, the last shots from the initial barrage from the suspect were fired. There were seven officers in the west hallway and four officers in the south hallway. (ISS)

At 11:36:10, officers from the west and south hallway advanced to rooms 111 and 112. As the officers entered the threshold of rooms 111 and 112, they were fired upon by the suspect, who was in room 111. The gunfire at 11:37:00 and 11:37:10 drove the officers away from the threshold of room 111 and 112 and back to the west and south hallways prior to either team making contact with either room 111 or 112 classroom doors. (ISS)

At 11:38:38, the suspect concludes firing, according to audio estimates 11 rounds are fired. (ISS)

Investigators advised that two officers were injured by building material fragments caused by the suspect’s rounds passing through the walls. (IOI and ISS)

Officers generally remained at the intersection of the west and south hallway and in the south hallway near the south entrance until the final assault. (IOI and ISS)

At 11:38:11, officers on scene, but outside of the hallway, call for additional assistance to include a tactical team with specialized capabilities. (BWC and UPD CS)

At 11:38:37, an officer outside of the hallway advises the suspect “is contained.” (BWC)

At 11:40:58, the suspect fires 1 round according to audio estimates. (ISS)

At 11:41:30, dispatch asked via radio if the door was locked, a UPD officer responds, “I am not sure, but we have a hooligan to break it.” (BWC)

At 11:44:00, the suspect fires one more round according to audio estimates. (ISS)

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At 11:48:18, a UCISD PD officer enters through the west hallway door and states, "She says she is shot," referring to his wife. He is escorted outside of the building. (BWC)

By 11:51:20, law enforcement from various agencies (including UPD, UCISD PD, Uvalde Sheriff's Office (USO), Fire Marshals, Constable Deputies, Southwest Texas Junior College Police Department (SWTJC PD), and the United States Border Patrol (BP) had arrived at the scene and were moving inside and out to evaluate the situation. (ISS, UPD CS, RL)

At 11:52:08, the first ballistic shield entered the west hallway. (ISS)

At 11:53:10, a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) special agent arrived at the perimeter and was advised to man the perimeter. Another officer makes a comment about there being kids still in the building, the DPS special agent advised, "if there is then they just need to go in."

At 11:56:49, the DPS special agent states "there's still kids over here. So, I'm getting the kids out!" (BWC)

At 12:03:51, a second ballistic shield arrives, and at 12:04:16 a third shield arrives on scene in the west hallway. (ISS)

At 12:06:16, UPD RL notes that no Command Post is set up, advised bodies needed to keep parents out. (RL)

At 12:10:17, officers in the west hallway begin passing out and donning gas masks. (ISS)

At 12:14:10, CS gas cannisters and launcher deliverable varieties are brought in. (ISS)

By 12:13:00, dispatchers had received numerous 9-1-1 calls from a child explaining that there were several children and one of her teachers deceased and another teacher hurt in room 112. (UPD 9-1-1)

At 12:15:27, it appears tactical team members of United States Border Patrol Tactical Teams (BORTAC) arrive and assist with fortifying the law enforcement position at the intersection with ballistic shields. (ISS)

At 12:20:46, a fourth ballistic shield arrives in the west hallway. (ISS)

At 12:21:08, four shots are fired by the suspect from within one of the two classrooms. (ISS)

At 12:21:22, BORTAC members move to a set of double doors within 36' of rooms 111 and 112 bringing two ballistic shields. However, no assault on the rooms was conducted. (ISS)

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At 12:23:35, BP medical team members began setting up medical triage in the east hallway in front of the restrooms. They had numerous backboards, medical kits, a defibrillator as well as bleeding control supplies. (ISS)

From 12:21:16 until 12:34:38, a continuous conversation takes place in the south hallway, involving UCISD PD Chief Arredondo and a UPD officer discussing tactical options and considerations including snipers, windows, and how to get into the classroom. They also discussed who has the keys, testing keys, the probability of the door being locked, and if kids and teachers are dying or dead. (BWC)

At 12:35:39, BP agents arrive in the west hallway with the first observed breaching tool, a Halligan tool. (ISS)

From 12:37:45 until 12:47:25, UCISD PD Chief Arredondo attempts to negotiate with the suspect, speaking in English and Spanish. The Chief also calls someone to try to look into the windows from outside, he then begins asking for more keys. At 12:46:18, he exclaims, "If y'all are ready to do it, you do it. But you should distract him out that window." At 12:47:25, Chief Arredondo states, "He's going in! He's going in! Tell those guys on the west that they're going in! Let 'em know!" (BWC)

At 12:47:57, a USO deputy arrives in the west hallway with a sledgehammer. (ISS)

At 12:50:03, an ad Hoc team assaults room 111, neutralizing the suspect. The suspect had concealed himself in a book closet, he then emerged when the team made entry. Footage showed officers frantically carrying the dead and injured to the casualty collection point (CCP) in the east hallway. Some law enforcement officers rushed casualties directly through the exterior door at the end of the west hallway. It is unknown if medical personnel (EMS) were staged nearby for direct patient handoff. (ISS)

The result of this incident was 19 children and two adults killed with an additional 17 reported injuries. Additionally, the suspect was neutralized through gunfire in the assault.